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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 7 RABAT 4534

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS MO
SUBJ: FIRST ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE

REF: A. STATE 167901, B. STATE 168320, C. MUSLO LTR, MSAP UPDATE
FY 80-84, DTD 25 NOV 77 (NOTAL), D. MUSLO MSG, MSAP UPDATE,
DTG 031301Z APR 78 (NOTAL), E. MUSLO MSG, MSAP UPDATE,
DTG 171645Z APR 78 (NOTAL), F. RABAT 5412, DTG 301611Z SEP 77,
G. RABAT 4465

1. (U) THE INFORMATION IN THIS MESSAGE IS PROVIDED IN RES-
PONSE TO REFTTEL A. EACH OF THE FOLLOWING PARAGRPAHS IS KEYED
TO THE PARAGRAPH IN REFTTEL (A) TO WHICH IT RESPONDS.

2. (S) STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE AND SECURITY OBJECTIVES: SEE
PARA 3A(1), REFTTEL A.

A. MOROCCO IS AN INTERNATIONAL CROSSROADS OF IMPORTANCE.
CONTROL OF MOROCCO BY A GOVERNMENT OR NATION HOSTILE TO THE
U.S. COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF UNRESTRICTED U.S. AND NATO USE
OF THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR. MOROCCO ALSO PROVIDES US A
POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE TO PORTUGUESE AND SPANISH PORT FACI-
LITIES. IT POSSESSES ONE OF THE BEST DEEP WATER PORTS IN

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AFRICA AT CASABLANCA. TANGIER HAS GOOD PORT FACILITIES AND
NADOR IS BEING DEVELOPED AS A DEEP WATER PORT ON THE
MEDITERRANEAN. MOROCCO HAS A WELL-DEVELOPIED AIR, ROAD AND
RAIL NETWORK. MOROCCO ACCEPTED A MODEST U.S. MILITARY
PRESENCE FROM INDEPENDENCE UNTIL THIS YEAR AND
HAS AGREED TO ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE LOCATION ON ITS SOIL OF
AND OPTICAL DEEP SPACE SURVEILLANCE STATION (GEODSS). U.S.

MILITARY SHIPS ARE WELCOME IN ITS PORTS AND OTHER FORMS OF U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE CANNOT BE RULED OUT FOR THE FUTURE.

B. THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE OF U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO MOROCCO IS TO MAINTAIN MOROCCO'S MODERATE AND PRO-WESTERN ORIENTATION ON REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ISSUES. MOROCCO HAS FREQUENTLY SUPPORTED POLICIES AND INITIATIVES FAVORED BY THE UNITED STATES AND PROVEN A LEADER AMONG AFRICAN AND MIDDLE-EASTERN MODERATES. OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS A VITAL MEANS OF INSURING MOROCCO'S PRO-WESTERN STANCE. WITHIN THIS GENERAL GOAL, THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM HAS FOUR PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES:

(1) TO ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY THAT WILL MAKE MOROCCO BETTER ABLE TO DEFEND HERSELF AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK. AT PRESENT, MOROCCO'S PRINCIPAL EXTERNAL THREAT EMANATES FROM NEIGHBORING ALGERIA, WHICH HAS BEEN HEAVILY ARMED BY THE USSR TO THE POINT WHERE THERE IS CONSIDERABLE IMBALANCE OF BOTH AIR AND ARMOR IN ALGERIA'S FAVOR. DESPITE INCREASES IN THE GOM INVENTORY, THIS DISPARITY IS GROWING WITH CONTINUING DELIVERIES TO ALGERIA. THIS DISPARITY THREATENS REGIONAL STABILITY.

(2) TO ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY FORCES CAPABLE OF PROVIDING SECURITY AGAINST EXTERNALLY BACKED GUERRILLA OR TERRORIST OPERATIONS IN MOROCCO.

(3) TO HELP PROMOTE CONTINUED FAVORABLE RELATIONS THAT ALLOW US ACCESS TO MOROCCAN PORTS AND POTENTIALLY TO BASE FACILITIES WHILE DENYING BASES TO HOSTILE NATIONS.

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(4) TO MAINTAIN TIES WITH AND INFLUENCE WITHIN THE MOROCCAN MILITARY WHICH IS THE INSTITUTION TODAY CONSIDERED MOST LIKELY OF GOVERNING IN THE EVENT OF ANY POST-HASSAN SITUATION. AT PRESENT THE LEADERSHIP OF THE ARMED FORCES IS CONSIDERED PRO-WESTERN.

3. (S) THREAT: SEE PARA 3A(2), REFTTEL A.

A. MOROCCO IS A MODERATE ARAB STATE THAT HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY IDENTIFIED WITH DEFENDING WESTERN INTERESTS. ALTHOUGH MOROCCO IS A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY, KING HASSAN II RULES WITH ALMOST ABSOLUTE AUTHORITY. A RECENTLY CONCLUDED SERIES OF ELECTIONS CULMINATED IN FORMATION OF A PARLIAMENT IN OCTOBER 1977.

B. THE COUNTRY SUFFERS FROM A VARIETY OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS THAT FACE MOST THIRD WORLD NATIONS. THERE IS AN UNDER-CURRENT OF DISCONTENT, BUT THE ARMY IS THE ONLY INSTITUTION CAPABLE OF OUSTING KING HASSAN IN THE SHORT TERM. MILITARY COUP ATTEMPTS FAILED IN 1971 AND 1972. SINCE THAT TIME THE KING'S PERSONAL POPULARITY HAS INCREASED. THE ANNEXATION OF PART OF THE SPANISH SAHARA CONTINUES TO BE A RALLYING FACTOR FOR THE NATION AND HAS ENHANCED THE KING'S PRESTIGE AT HOME. AT PRESENT THERE APPEARS TO BE

NO SERIOUS INTERNAL THREAT ALTHOUGH ECONOMIC PROBLEMS COULD GIVE RISE TO SOCIAL TENSIONS IN COMING MONTHS. THREE FACTORS COULD CONTRIBUTE TO A DETERIORATION IN THE PRESENT INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION: THE PERCEPTION THAT THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS ARE NOT ALL THAT WAS PROMISED, POSSIBLE MILITARY REVERSES THAT COULD MOVE THE ARMY TO TAKE ACTION, OR RAPID DETERIORATION OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY.

C. THE PRINCIPAL EXTERNAL THREATS TO MOROCCO ARE FROM ALGERIA AND THE ALGERIAN-SUPPORTED POLISARIO FRONT. THE POLISARIO IS A GUERRILLA MOVEMENT THAT CLAIMS TO REPRESENT THE PEOPLE OF SPANISH SAHARA AND SEEKS TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT SAHARAN STATE. IT HAS ABOUT 5,000 DESERT FIGHTERS, REPORTEDLY RECRUITED FROM AS FAR AFIELD AS MALI, WHO OPERATE IN THE WESTERN SAHARA AND MAURITANIA, AND OCCASIONALLY IN SECRET

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SOUTHERN MOROCCO. THE POLISARIO IS BASED IN THE TINDOUF AREA OF EXTREME WESTERN ALGERIA AND IS ALSO SUPPORTED BY LIBYA.

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D. THE POLISARIO IS CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING HARASSING ATTACKS THROUGHOUT THE AREA OF CONFLICT BUT POSES NO SERIOUS MILITARY THREAT AT PRESENT TO MOROCCAN CONTROL OF THE SAHARA. THE POLISARIO IS ELUSIVE AND HAS FRUSTRATED MOROCCAN

ATTEMPTS TO DEFEAT IT OR REDUCE ITS ACTIVITIES. AS IN MOST INSURGENCY WARFARE, THE POLISARIO THREAT COULD BE LONG TERM, SEEKING TO BLEED MOROCCAN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC RESOURCES. ABOUT 10,000 MOROCCAN TROOPS ARE LOCATED IN MAURITANIA IN CONNECTION WITH A MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY. THE POLISARIO HAS BEEN MORE ACTIVE IN MAURITANIA THAN MOROCCO AND DEFENSE OF ITS NEIGHBOR COULD CAUSE A DRAIN ON GOM RESOURCES.

E. ALGERIA'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES, WHICH ENJOY A WIDENING MARGIN IN OVER-ALL FIRE POWER, POSE THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO MOROCCO. THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE A LONG COMMON BORDER WHICH REMAINS IN DISPUTE, AND TENSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO OVER ALGERIAN SUPPORT OF POLISARIO HAVE RESULTED IN A STEADY DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO AND AN ARMS RACE IN THE REGION. THE ALGERIANS HAVE BEEN BUILDING UP THEIR ARMED FORCES IN RECENT YEARS WITH \$1.3 BILLION WORTH OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS WITH THE USSR. ALGERIA IS RECEIVING SUCH MODERN ARMS AS T-62 TANKS, SA-6 SAM'S, MI-24 HIND ATTACK HELICOPTERS, AND MIG-23 FIGHTERS. IN ADDITION,
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ALGERIA HAS BEEN IMPROVING ITS MILITARY POSTURE ALONG THE BORDER, PARTICULARLY IN THE TINDOUF AREA.

F. ALTHOUGH MOROCCAN FRUSTRATIONS WITH THE POLISARIO OR A MISREADING OF MOROCCAN MILITARY INTENTIONS BY ALGERIA COULD CONCEIVABLY LEAD TO HOSTILITIES, THE MILITARY SITUATION IS MOST LIKELY TO REMAIN THE SAME FOR THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE WITH NEITHER SIDE WILLING TO RISK DIRECT MILITARY CONFRONTATION. THE MOROCCAN ARMY IS CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF CONTAINING AN ALGERIAN ATTACK AT ANY ONE POINT ALONG THE BORDER FOR AT LEAST A FEW DAYS BUT WOULD BE HARD PRESSED TO DEFEND ALONG THE ENTIRE LENGTH OF THE BORDER, ESPECIALLY IN THE NORTH IN THE OUJDA AREA.

G. IN ADDITION TO THE ALGERIAN THREAT, MOROCCO PERCEIVES A THREAT FROM LIBYA, WHICH IS ALSO ASSISTING THE POLISARIO. IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES WITH ALGERIA, MOROCCO BELIEVES THAT THE SOVIET ARMS IN LIBYA WOULD BE USED AGAINST THEM. BOTH COUNTRIES ARE PERCEIVED BY MOROCCO AS RADICAL STATES UNDER SOVIET INFLUENCE WHICH ARE FIRMLY OPPOSED TO THE MODERATE PRO-WEST GOVERNMENT OF KING HASSAN.

H. MILITARILY, MOROCCO'S STRATEGY TO MEET THE THREAT POSED BY ALGERIA IS TO BUILD A STRONGER DEFENSIVE FORCE IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE IMBALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS IMPROVED DEFENSIVE POSTURE SHOULD FOSTER A MORE FAVORABLE CLIMATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH ALGERIA.

4. (C) THE MISSION'S PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL, IS BASICALLY THE SAME AS WHAT IS UNDERSTOOD TO BE THE HOST COUNTRY'S ESTIMATE, EXCEPT THAT WE VIEW THE SOVIET ROLE AS LESS ACTIVIST THAN DOES THE GOM.

5. (C) TYPE OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT: SEE PARA 3A(4),
REFTEL A. IN ORDER TO MEET THE THREAT POSED BY ALGERIA,
ESPECIALLY WITH SUPERIOR NUMBERS OF TANKS AND COMBAT
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AIRCRAFT, MOROCCO IS ATTEMPTING TO BUILD A MILITARY FORCE WHICH HAS A STRONG ANTI-TANK AND ANTI-AIR CAPABILITY. THIS INCLUDES MECHANIZATION OF FOUR INFANTRY REGIMENTS, RE-EQUIPPING ITS FOUR ARMOR BATTALIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TWO ADDITIONAL ARMOR BATTALIONS IN THE FUTURE, AND BUILDING UP ITS AIR DEFENSE WITH ANTI-AIR ARTILLERY UNITS AND ADDITIONAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. AN INTEGRAL PART OF THIS PROGRAM IS AN AIR DEFENSE RADAR SYSTEM. THE GUERRILLA WAR IN THE SAHARA HAS CAUSED MOROCCO TO BUILD A COUNTER-GUERRILLA FORCE IN ADDITION TO ITS CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

6. (S) FORCES IN RELATION TO U.S. INTERESTS: SEE PARA 3A(5), REFTEL A. U.S. INTERESTS IN MOROCCO WERE DESCRIBED IN RABAT 0271, 13 JAN 78. AMONG THEM ARE THE MAINTENANCE OF AN ESSENTIALLY PRO-WESTERN STANCE, REGIONAL STABILITY, IMPROVED MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIPS, AND PROMOTION OF U.S. ECONOMIC INTERESTS. ASSISTANCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FORCES DESCRIBED ABOVE TO COUNTER THE DIRECT ALGERIAN THREAT WOULD WORK TOWARD THE MAINTENANCE OF A PRO-WESTERN STANCE IN MOROCCO AT THE SAME TIME IT WOULD HELP CORRECT ARMS IMBALANCE IN NORTH AFRICA. AN ENHANCED REGIONAL STABILITY RESULTING FROM A QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE IMPROVEMENT IN THE MILITARY BALANCE VIS-A-VIS MOROCCO AND ALGERIA SHOULD BUILD CONFIDENCE IN EXPANDING GOM DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, CALM SPANISH APPREHENSIONS, AND ENCOURAGE FURTHER ADVANCES IN HUMAN RIGHTS.

7. (C) DEFENSE SPENDING IN THE ECONOMY AS A WHOLE: SEE PARA 3A(6), REFTEL A. IT IS DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE THE EFFECT OF DEFENSE SPENDING, ESPECIALLY IN THE SAHARA CONFLICT, ON MOROCCO'S ECONOMY. ALTHOUGH THE WAR EFFORT UNDOUBTEDLY DRAINS IMPORTANT RESOURCES, REVENUE LABOR AND MANAGERIAL EXPERTISE FROM PRODUCTIVE SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY, THIS IS TO A CERTAIN EXTENT OFFSET BY THE REPORTEDLY SUBSTANTIAL, BUT SPECIFICALLY UNIDENTIFIABLE, SUBSIDIES MADE BY "FRIENDLY ARAB GOVERNMENTS" (E.E. SAUDI ARABIA & KUWAIT).
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NEVERTHELESS, THE RELATIVELY LARGE ROLE OF DEFENSE SPENDING IN THE ECONOMY PLACES A GREAT BURDEN ON A SYSTEM ALREADY STRAINED BY BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, LIQUIDITY AND DEBT SERVICE PROBLEMS.

A. KNOWN 1977 PERFORMANCE: THE OFFICIAL 1977 NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET TOTALLED APPROXIMATELY \$806.8 MILLION, OR 8.5 PER CENT OF THE GNP. MILITARY EXPENDITURES AMOUNTED TO 17.5 PER CENT OF THE STATE OPERATING BUDGET AND 17.0 PER CENT OF THE STATE INVESTMENT BUDGET. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE OFFICIAL FIGURES ONLY REVEAL AN ESTIMATED 30 TO 40 PER CENT OF TOTAL DEFENSE SPENDING. THE FOLLOWING PROBABLE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE OFFICIAL FIGURES:

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(1) MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OPERATING BUDGET FOR AUXILIARY FORCES AND BORDER PATROL (DOLS 96.5 MILLION).

(2) "UNFORESEEN AND UNDECIDED" GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (DOLS 262.4 MILLION) IN THE STATE BUDGET.

(3) ACCORDING TO BANK OF MOROCCO FIGURES FOR 1977 GOM EXPENDITURES, OVER DOL 700 MILLION WERE USED IN GOVERNMENTAL TRANSACTIONS. WE ESTIMATE OVER 90 PERCENT OF THIS AMOUNT WAS USED FOR WEAPON PURCHASES FINANCED BY UNREPORTED FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. FOR EXAMPLE, SAUDI ARABIA AND KIWAITI ANNUAL SUPPORT IS RUMORED TO BE IN THE DOL 750-800 MILLION RANGE.

(4) MILITARY CONSTRUCTION COSTS BORNE BY OTHER MINISTRIES.

B. OFFICIAL GOM 1977 MILITARY IMPORTS TOTALLED DOLS 351.7 MILLION OR 11.1 PER CENT OF TOTAL IMPORTS.

C. ESTIMATED 1978 DEFENSE SPENDING. THE OFFICIAL 1978 NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET TOTALLED APPROXIMATELY DOLS 809.0 MILLION OR 7.2 PER CENT OF THE ESTIMATED GNP. MILITARY EXPENDITURES AMOUNTED TO 20.3 PER CENT OF THE STATE OPERATING BUDGET AND

18.5 PER CENT OF THE STATE INVESTMENT BUDGET. AS WAS THE CASE IN 1977, OFFICIAL 1978 FIGURES UNDERSTATE CONSIDERABLY THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF DEFENSE SPENDING. NOT INCLUDED IN THESE FIGURES ARE:

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(1) MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OPERATING BUDGET FOR AUXILIARY FORCES AND BORDER PATROL (DOLS 127.8 MILLION).

(2) "UNFORESEEN AND UNDECIDED" GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (DOLS 110.6 MILLION).

(3) UNREPORTED FOREIGN AID (E.G. SAUDI ARABIA & KUWAIT).

(4) CONSTRUCTION COSTS BORNE BY OTHER MINISTRIES.

D. PROJECTED OFFICIAL 1978 MILITARY IMPORTS TOTALLED DOLS 434.3 MILLION OR 14.0 PER CENT OF PROJECTED TOTAL IMPORTS. MOROCCO'S DEBT SERVICE TO EXPORT RATIO FOR 1978 IS EXPECTED TO BE IN THE 20 PER CENT RANGE. THIS BURDEN ON THE NATIONAL TREASURY WOULD AFFECT MOROCCO'S ABILITY TO MAKE TIMELY REPAYMENTS IN MILITARY SALES PROGRAM.

8. (S) DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES PROJECTED FOR GOM IN FY 80-82: SEE PARA 3A(8), REFTEL A. ITEMS WERE EXTRACTED FROM REFTELS C, D, AND E.

A. FY 80:

(1) AERIAL TANKER - KC-130H. GOM HAS PURCHASED FRENCH FIGHTER AIRCRAFT WHICH CAN BE CONFIGURED FOR IN-FLIGHT REFUELING AND DESIRES TO PURCHASE AERIAL TANKER AIRCRAFT. THIS CAPABILITY WOULD ENABLE THE RMAF TO REACT TO A HOSTILE INCURSION, MOST LIKELY FROM ALGERIA, BY LAUNCHING A LARGE PORTION OF THE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT FLEET AND KEEPING THEM AIRBORNE UNTIL ALL WEAPONS WERE EXPENDED OR THE THREAT SUBSIDED. AERIAL REFUELING CAPABILITY COULD ALSO YIELD A VERY SIGNIFICANT SAVING IN REDUCED REQUIREMENT FOR PERMANENT FIXED BASE FACILITIES BY PROVIDING EXTENDED RANGE AND FULL COUNTRY COVERAGE FROM PARENT BASES. ADDITIONALLY, AN AERIAL REFUELING CAPABILITY WOULD ALLOW THE GOM TO ESTABLISH A COMBAT AIR PATROL ORBIT ALONG THE COMMON BORDER WITH ALGERIA, DURING PERIOD OF HEIGHTENED TENSION, PROVIDING AN IMMEDIATE INTERCEPT OF INCOMING AIRCRAFT.

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(2) ANTI-ARMOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS. ACQUISITION OF THE AH-1S TOW-EQUIPPED HELICOPTER, AND GROUND MOUNTED TOW AND DRAGON ANTI-TANK SYSTEMS WOULD CREATE A MULTIDIMENSIONAL ANTI-TANK DEFENSE SYSTEM NEEDED BY GOM TO COUNTER AN INCREASING ALGERIAN ARMOR SUPERIORITY. THESE SYSTEMS WOULD INCLUDE AIR-

CRAFT TO ENGAGE ARMOR WELL FORWARD OF MAIN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS, AND GROUND MOUNTED TOW AND DRAGON SYSTEMS TO ENGAGE PENETRATING ARMOR UNITS. THESE SYSTEMS WOULD PROBABLY BE ASSIGNED TO DEFENSIVE FORCES ASTRIDE THE MOST PROBABLE INVASION ROUTE FROM ALGERIA, THE TAZA AND MIDELET GAPS, PROVIDING AN ACTIVE DEFENSE AGAINST ARMOR INTRUSION.

(3) AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS: IN ITS REQUEST OF 13 SEP 77, GOM STATED A REQUIREMENT FOR THE REDEYE OR STINGER. ALTHOUGH THE REDEYE IS NOT PRESENTLY AUTHORIZED FOR SALE TO MOROCCO, IT WOULD RESPOND TO THE RMA'S NEED FOR A MAN-PORTABLE, DEFENSE AGAINST LOW LEVEL ATTACK AIRCRAFT.

(4) MISSILE SUPPORT. THIS INCLUDES GROUND TEST EQUIPMENT AND SPECIAL TOOLING REQUIRED FOR TOW AND DRAGON MISSILE STORAGE, CHECKOUT AND OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT.

(5) V-150 CADILLAC-GAGE COMMANDO ARMORED CARS. THE GOM INCLUDED THE V-150 WHEELED ARMORED CAR IN THE 13 SEP 77 ARMS REQUEST. THESE VEHICLES WERE REQUESTED IN SEVERAL CONFIGURATIONS INCLUDING COMMAND VEHICLES AND PLATFORMS FOR 90MM GUNS AND MORTARS. THEY COULD BE USED EFFECTIVELY TO UPGRADE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES AND IN SOUTHERN DESERT OPERATIONS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED HOWEVER THAT SINCE THE SEP 77 REQUEST, GOM HAS RECEIVED A LARGE NUMBER OF SIMILAR VEHICLES FROM FRANCE AND AUSTRIA. THESE ACQUISITIONS MAY HAVE SATISFIED THE GOM SHORT TERM REQUIREMENT FOR WHEELED ARMORED CARS.

(6) WEAPONS - .50 CAL MACHINE GUNS AND 20MM CANNON. THESE WEAPONS WERE INCLUDED IN THE 13 SEP 77 REQUEST. THEY MAY BE DESIRED FOR VEHICLE OR AIRBORNE APPLICATION, AND COULD BE USED IN THE SOUTH.

(7) EW/GCI RADAR NET. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY-WIDE AIR DEFENSE AND AIRSPACE CONTROL RADAR WILL BE IN ITS THIRD YEAR OF DEVELOPMENT WITH AN INTERIM REDUCED OPERATIONAL SECRET

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CAPABILITY EXPECTED BY SUMMER 1981, AND SYSTEM COMPLETION BY 1982. THIS SYSTEM WILL PROVIDE AN INTEGRATED, COUNTRY-WIDE AIR DEFENSE NET CAPABLE OF EARLY WARNING, INTERCEPT BY AIR AND GROUND ELEMENTS OF AIR DEFENSE, AND NORMAL AIRSPACE FOR BOTH CIVIL AND MILITARY AVIATION.

(8) AMMUNITION. AMMUNITION PROJECTED IS TO REPLACE 20/105/155MM ROUNDS USED IN TRAINING PROGRAMS, TO MAINTAIN CREW PROFICIENCY, ENHANCE/MAINTAIN COMBAT READINESS. ROTATION OF THE AMMUNITION THROUGH TRAINING INSURES THAT BASIC LOAD OF COMBAT AMMUNITION IS CURRENT.

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(9) OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE BUDGETING INCLUDES
THE DEDICATION OF FUNDS (DOLS 26 MILLION IN FY 80) TO PROVIDE
FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT BY INITIATING A SUPPLY SUPPORT ARRANGEMENT
(SSA). SSA IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE FOR MOROCCO'S PARTICIPATION
IN THE US LOGISTICAL SYSTEM. TIMELY AND CONTINUOUS SUPPORT
OF US BUILT EQUIPMENT WILL BE DEPENDENT UPON IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE PROPOSED SSA.

B. PROJECTION FOR FY 81/82:

(1) CONTINUED PROGRAMS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF MOROCCAN
ARMED FORCES IN FY 81/82 FALL INTO THREE CATEGORIES:

(1) CONTINUE PLANNED UPGRADING OF ANTI-ARMOR
CAPABILITY BY THE ACQUISITION OF TOW AH-1S HELICOPTERS, IN
PURSUIT OF EVENTUAL TOTAL OF TWENTY-FOUR AIRCRAFT.

(B) GIVING THE MOROCCAN ARMY A VIABLE, MULTIFACED
AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY.

(C) ESTABLISHING A FUNCTIONAL LOGISTICAL SYSTEM
FROM THE DEPOT LEVEL TO THE USING UNIT.

(2) GOM MAY CONTINUE TO SEEK ADDITIONAL WHEELED ARMORED
CARS TO REPLACE LOSSES OF CARS CURRENTLY IN THEIR INVENTORY.

(3) A CONTINUED INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
AND TRAINING PROGRAM IS ANTICIPATED TO PROVIDE FOLLOW-ON
OPERATOR AND LOGISTICS/MAINTENANCE TRAINING FOR EQUIPMENT OF
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US ORIGIN: FOR EXPANSION OF THE IN-COUNTRY ENGLISH LANGUAGE
PROGRAM; AND FOR PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (PME) COURSES.

9. (S) ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT: SEE PARA 3A(9), REFTEL A.

A. GIVEN THE GEO-POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE REGION, GOM
CAN BE EXPECTED TO SEEK CONTINUING AND POSSIBLY INCREASED

MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN SPITE OF ITS LIMITED FINANCIAL MEANS. MOROCCO IS CURRENTLY SUFFERING FROM SUBSTANTIAL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND LIQUIDITY PROBLEMS, AND ACQUISITION OF THE MILITARY ARTICLES AND SERVICES PROJECTED ON A COMMERCIAL BASIS WOULD INCREASE THE BURDEN ON THE ECONOMY THESE ITEMS ALONE, HOWEVER, WILL NOT MAKE THAT BURDEN INTOLERABLE. DEFENSE SUBSIDIES FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT ARE BELIEVED SUFFICIENT TO OFFSET THE MAJORITY OF MOROCCAN MILITARY CAPITAL EQUIPMENT PURCHASES.

B. MOROCCO'S FMS REPAYMENTS ARE ON OCCASION LATE, BUT SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN DEFENSE SUBSIDIES SERVE IN LARGE MEASURE TO ASSURE THE GOM'S ABILITY TO REPAY. WHILE THE ACQUISITION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN GENERAL HAS AN INDIRECT NEGATIVE IMPACT ON MOROCCO'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES; THE GOM'S FIRM INTENTION TO OBTAIN SUCH MATERIEL AS A FIRST PRIORITY INDICATES THAT THE REMOVAL OF US SUPPORT WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO OUR COUNTRIES' MUTUAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS.

10. ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENT: SEE PARA 3A(10), REFTEL A. MOROCCO IS OUTGUNNED BY ALGERIA IN OFFENSIVE AIR AND ARMOR CAPABILITIES. IN ADDITION, THE ALGERIANS' EQUIPMENT IS BASICALLY HOMOGENEOUS, HAVING COME ALMOST TOTALLY FROM THE SOVIET UNION, A FLOW THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO CONTINUE. IT IS WELL SUPPORTED IN TERMS OF SPARE PARTS AND IN-COUNTRY SOVIET TECHNICIANS. THE MOROCCANS, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAVE NO EFFECTIVE OFFENSIVE AIR CAPABILITY OPERATIONAL AT THIS TIME.

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ADDITIONALLY, THEIR OTHER COMBAT EQUIPMENT IS A MIXTURE OF AMERICAN, FRENCH, GERMAN AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT RUSSIAN. THESE FACTORS ALONG WITH A PAUCITY OF SOURCE-COUNTRY TECHNICIANS AND SPARE PARTS, RESULT IN SHORTAGES OF COMBAT-READY EQUIPMENT. GIVEN THIS SITUATION, THE ACQUISITION OF NEW AIR DEFENSE MISSILE SYSTEMS AND IMPROVEMENT IN ANTI-TANK CAPABILITY AS WELL AS AERIAL REFUELERS WOULD HELP MOROCCO'S DEFENSE POSTURE AGAINST ALGERIA EVEN THOUGH THE ALGERIAN ADVANTAGES WOULD STILL BE THREE TO ONE IN AIRCRAFT AND TWO TO ONE IN ARMOR (RATIO ESTIMATED FOR FY 80). TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THESE ADDITIONS TO THE MOROCCAN INVENTORY WOULD SERVE TO DECREASE THE CURRENT MILITARY IMBALANCE THAT STRONGLY FAVORS ALGERIA AND WOULD LESSEN CHANCES FOR DESTABILIZATION IN NORTH AFRICA.

11. (S) HUMAN RIGHTS STATEMENT: SEE PARA 3A(11), REFTEL B.

A. TRADITIONALLY TOLERANT IN ITS ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS AND OTHER MINORITIES, MOROCCO'S RECORD ON POLITICAL FREEDOMS ALSO HAS IMPROVED OVER THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF. NATIONAL ELECTIONS WERE COMPLETED IN 1977 AND A NEW PARLIAMENT INCLUDING A VOCAL OPPOSITION HAS BECOME A FUNCTIONING PART OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM. INTERNAL PRESS CENSORSHIP HAS ENDED AND A

NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AMNESTIED AND/OR RELEASED FROM DETENTION. WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN SCATTERED REPORTS OF REMAINING HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF A CONTINUING PATTERN OF ABUSE.

B. WE SEE NO INDICATIONS THAT TRAINING OR MATERIEL OBTAINED THROUGH THE US SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ARE BEING USED IN MOROCCAN LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES NOR DO WE BELIEVE THE WEAPONS OR TRAINING PROVIDED UNDER THE US PROGRAM COULD BE EASILY DIVERTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT. WE BELIEVE MOROCCO CAN CONTINUE TO IMPROVE ITS PRACTICES IN THIS AREA AND THE GOM IS HEADED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. CONTINUED EMPHASIS ON THE IMPORTANCE THAT THE US ATTACHES TO HUMAN RIGHTS DURING HIGH LEVEL SECURITY ASSISTANCE CONSULTATIONS SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE GOM TO CONTINUE ITS PROGRESS IN THIS AREA.

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12. (S) SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER SOURCES: SEE PARA 4A(12), REFTEL A.

A. MILITARY ASSISTANCE:

(1) MOROCCO'S PRIMARY SOURCE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE IS FRANCE, WHICH PROVIDES MATERIEL, TRAINING AND ADVISORS. FRENCH ASSISTANCE TO THE GROUND FORCES INCLUDES ARMORED VEHICLES, 155MM SP HOWITZERS (35), TANK-LIKE VEHICLES (100) FOR THE MODERNIZATION OF A TWO-BRIGADE FORCE. HOT AND MILAN ANTI-TANK AND CROTALE AIR DEFENSE MISSILES ARE ON ORDER. IN ADDITION FRANCE IS PROVIDING AML ARMORED CARS FOR USE IN THE SAHARA. FRENCH MATERIEL FOR THE AIR FORCE INCLUDES HELICOPTERS, MIRAGE F-1'S (50 ON ORDER) AND ALF-JET AIRCRAFT (24). IN RECENT YEARS THE NAVY HAS PURCHASED TWO PR-72 COMBAT PATROL AND THREE BATRAL CLASS MEDIUM LANDING SHIPS FROM FRANCE AND IS CONSIDERING THE PURCHASE OF TWO AVISO CLASS FRIGATES. AUSTRIA IS THE SOURCE OF 108 SELF-PROPELLED TANK DESTROYERS BEING USED TO REPLACE OLD FRENCH TANKS. WEST GERMANY HAS BEEN THE SOURCE OF VEHICLES AND SUPPLIES. MOROCCO OBTAINS SMALL ARMS AND AMMUNITION FROM BELGIUM. ITALY HAS BEEN THE SOURCE OF UTILITY HELICOPTERS AND WILL BE PROVIDING SIX CH-47 CARGO HELICOPTERS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. MOROCCO HAS ON ORDER ONE DESCUBIERTA CLASS FRIGATE AND FOUR PATROL BOATS FROM SPAIN. SWITZERLAND HAS BEEN THE SOURCE OF 10 TRAINING AIRCRAFT.

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FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6221
INFO SECDEF WASHDC//ISA/DSAA//
JCS WASHDC
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(2) THE USSR AND OTHER COMMUNIST BLOC COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN THE SOURCE OF MILITARY HARDWARE IN THE PAST, BUT FOR THE LAST TWO YEARS LITTLE MATERIEL HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM THESE COUNTRIES.

B. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (NON-US) TO MOROCCO DURING 1977
EXTRACTED FROM UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT DOCUMENTS:

- (1) GRANT AID FROM VARIOUS DEVELOPMENT FUNDS -DOLS 800 MILLION.
- (2) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE LOANS - DOLS 80 MILLION.
- (3) CAPITAL ASSISTANCE LOANS - DOLS 683.6 MILLION.
- (A) FRANCE -DOLS 65 MILLION
- (B) FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY - DOLS 102.1 MILLION
- (C) SPAIN - DOLS 87 MILLION.
- (D) CANADA -DOLS 2.8 MILLION
- (E) AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK - DOLS 5.6 MILLION.
- (F) IMF - DOLS 69 MILLION.
- (G) SDR/IMF - DOLS 6.0 MILLION.
- (H) IBRD - DOLS 167.5 MILLION.
- (I) ARAB FUND FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
-DOLS 105 MILLION.
- (J) KUWAIT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FUND - DOLS 33 MILLION.
- (K) SAUDI DEVELOPMENT FUND - DOLS 2.6 MLLION.

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- (L) ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT FUND - DOLS 35 MILLION.
- (M) OPEC - DOLS 3.0 MILLION.

NOTE: ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT IS BELIEVED TO BE CONSIDERABLY HIGHER THAN THE FIGURE REFLECTED IN THE UNPD BUT CANNOT BE SPECIFICALLY QUANTIFIED.

13. (S) SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM LEVELS - MOROCCO: SEE
PARA 4A(13), REFTTEL A.

A. SECURITY ASSISTANCE LEVELS RECOMMENDED FOR MOROCCO ARE

DESCRIBED BELOW. EACH LEVEL INCLUDES FMS CREDITS AND IMETP; MOROCCO DOES NOT RECEIVE GRANT AID MATERIEL.

B. MOROCCO HAS REQUESTED 24 AH-1S TOW COBRA HELICOPTERS (REF F). IT IS ESTIMATED THAT 12 AH-1S AIRCRAFT COULD COVER EITHER OF THE TWO AVENUES OF APPROACH FROM ALGERIA. SUPPORT OF THE AH-1S WILL BE FACILITATED BY THE PRESENCE IN MOROCCO OF 40 AB-205 HELICOPTERS. THESE AIRCRAFT, THE ITALIAN VERSION OF THE UH-1H, ARE SUPPORTED FROM ITALY, AND HAVE CONSIDERABLE COMMANILITY WITH THE AH-1S. ACQUISITION OF THE TOTAL FORCE OF 24 AIRCRAFT OVER A TWO-YEAR PERIOD BEGINNING FY 80 WILL PERMIT RAPID REALIZATION OF THE DESIRED DEFENSIVE FORCE. TWELVE OF THESE HELICOPTERS WITH ASSOCIATED SUPPORT ARE ESTIMATED TO COST DOLS 60,000,000. IT IS ASSUMED THAT MOROCCO COULD HAVE AVAILABLE CASH RESOURCES SUFFICIENT TO PURCHASE THREE HELICOPTERS (DOLS 15,000,000). THIS IS ONE LESS THAN THE TOTAL OF 4 AIRCRAFT ESTIMATED AS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE A MINIMUM OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE FORCE. THE AVAILABILITY OF FMS CREDITS WOULD ENABLE MOROCCO TO PURCHASE ADDITIONAL AH-1S AIRCRAFT IN ORDER TO DEVELOP A VIABLE DEFENSE CAPABILITY.

C. FMS CREDIT LEVEL - FY 80:

(1) MINIMUM LEVEL:

(A) DESCRIPTION: A MINIMUM POSITION OF DOLS 20 MILLION WOULD ALLOW THE PURCHASE OF 4 ADDITIONAL HELICOPTERS, FOR A TOTAL OF 7. THIS NUMBER WOULD PERMIT DEFENSIVE COVERAGE
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OF ONE OF THE AVENUES OF APPROACH AT A REDUCED LEVEL OF EFFECTIVENESS.

(B) RISK ASSESSMENT - WHILE NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE A FULLY EFFECTIVE COUNTER TO AN ARMOR INCURSION, THE PURCHASE OF 4 AIRCRAFT FINANCED BY FMS CREDIT COMBINED WITH CASH PURCHASES OF THREE WOULD ASSURE AT LEAST A MINIMUM DEPLOYABLE FORCE FOR THE COVERAGE OF ONE MAIN ACCESS ROUTE FROM ALGERIA. THIS NUMBER WOULD ALSO ASSURE THAT MINIMUM NUMBER OF HELICOPTERS TO FIELD A DEPLOYABLE FORCE EVEN IF GOM CANNOT AFFORD THE ASSUMED CASH PURCHASE OF THREE. THE TOW HELICOPTER IS SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED AS AN ANTI-ARMOR WEAPON AND AS SUCH IS NOT APPROPRIATE, OR EFFECTIVE, FOR USE AS AN ANTI-PERSONNEL WEAPON. FOR THIS REASON THE WEAPON IS NOT DEEMED SUITABLE FOR AN INTERNAL POLICING ROLE AND THEREFORE SHOULD CARRY NO HUMAN RIGHTS CONNOTATIONS.

(2) INTERMEDIATE LEVEL - DOLS 30,000,000:

(A) DESCRIPTION: FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD ALLOW THE PURCHASE OF SIX AH-1S AIRCRAFT.

(B) RISK ASSESSMENT: WHEN COMBINED WITH CASH PURCHASES, SIX AIRCRAFT WOULD ALLOW NEARLY FULL OPERATIONAL COVERAGE OF ONE APPROACH ROUTE OR MINIMUM COVERAGE OF BOTH MAJOR INVASION PATHS INTO MOROCCO. THIS ADDED FLEXIBILITY COULD SERVE AS A MAJOR DETERRENT TO AN ALGERIAN ARMOR ATTACK.

(3) CURRENT LEVEL - DOLS 45,000,000:

(A) DESCRIPTION: FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD
ALLOW THE PURCHASE OF NINE AH-1S AIRCRAFT.

(B) RISK ASSESSMENT: THIS LEVEL COMBINED WITH
ASSUMED CASH PURCHASES WOULD ALLOW FULLY EFFECTIVE COVERAGE OF
ONE PRINCIPAL AVENUE OF APPROACH INTO MOROCCO, OR COVERAGE OF
BOTH AVENUES AT A REDUCED LEVEL OF EFFECTIVENESS. ADDITIONALLY,
IF CASH PURCHASED HELICOPTERS WERE NOT FORTHCOMING, 9 AIRCRAFT
COULD PROVIDE ADEQUATE COVER OF ONE APPROACH OR A MINIMUM
COVERAGE OF BOTH MAIN ACCESS ROUTES. FURTHER, THIS LEVEL OF
FUNDING COULD BE A STRONG INDICATION OF SUPPORT FOR MOROCCO.

(4) INCREMENTAL LEVEL - DOLS 60,000,000:

(A) DESCRIPTION: FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD
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ALLOW THE PURCHASE OF 12 AH-1S TOW HELICOPTERS.

(B) RISK ALAYSIS: AT THIS LEVEL GOM IS ASSURED
OF A MINIMUM DEFENSIVE COVERAGE ALONG BOTH ARMOR APPROACHES INTO
MOROCCO OR A FULLY OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ON ONE OF THREE AVENUES.
WHILE ALL PREVIOUS LEVELS HAVE ASSUMED A GOM CAPABILITY TO
PURCHASE THREE AIRCRAFT, THIS LEVEL OF US FUNDING WOULD ALLOW
APPLICATION OF THOSE GOM RESOURCES TO OTHER CRITICAL AREAS OF
DEFENSE MODERNIZATION, OR APPLICATION TO THE CIVILIAN SECTOR.
AVAILABILITY OF THE AH-1S SYSTEM WOULD CREATE A MORE BALANCED
MILITARY POSTURE BETWEEN MOROCCO AND ALGERIA, WOULD ENHANCE
POLITICAL STABILITY IN THE REGION THEREBY CREATING A FAVORABLE
CLIMATE FOR CONTINUING PROGRESS IN HUMAN RIGHTS.

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D. IMETP ANALYSIS -FY 80:

(1) WITH THE INCREASES IN EQUIPMENT SOPHISITICATION AND FORCE LEVELS A WELL-ROUNDED IMET PROGRAM COVERING MANAGEMENT AND TECHNICAL SKILLS AS WELL AS PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION, IS ESSENTIAL. INTEGRAL TO ALL PROGRAM LEVELS IS FOLLOW-ON TRAINING IN SUPPORT OF US ORIGIN EQUIPMENT, ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTORS FOR THE IN-COUNTRY ENGLISH LANGUAGE PROGRAM; TECHNICAL INSTRUCTOR COURSES TO ALLOW DEVELOPMENT OF A LOCAL TRAINING CAPABILITY; SUPPLY MANAGEMENT AND PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (PME) TO DEVELOP THE LEADERSHIP SKILLS NECESSARY TO A MODERN ARMED FORCE. WHILE PME CONSTITUTES A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF ALL PROGRAM LEVELS, THE MAJORITY OF SPACES ARE LIKELY TO BE IN TECHNICAL SKILLS. GOM FEELS THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TRAINED MANPOWER BASE IS THE MOST CRITICAL TASK IMMEDIATELY FACING ITS FORCE EXPANSION AND RECENT EQUIPMENT ACQUISITIONS. AT THE LOWER PROGRAM LEVELS, THIS IS APT TO RESULT IN THEIR SEEKING TO ELIMINATE PME SPACES IN FAVOR OF TECHNICAL SCHOOL SPACES, WHILE AT HIGHER LEVELS GOM WOULD LIKELY INCREASE THE USE OF AVAILABLE PROFESSIONAL COURSES. THE SOPHISTICATED LEVEL OF TRAINING NEEDED TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN US EQUIPMENT REQUIRES EXTENSIVE SUPPORT FACILITIES, TRAINING AIDS AND INSTRUCTOR PERSONNEL NOT AVAILABLE IN MOROCCO. IN MANY CASES

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THE NUMBER OF STUDENTS TO BE TRAINED WOULD NOT JUSTIFY DEPLOYMENT OF AN MTT. ELIMINATION OF THE IMETP OR A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN TIS FUNDING TO MOROCCO WOULD BE SEEN AS A NEGATIVE SIGNAL BY THE ROYAL MOROCCAN ARMED FORCES WITH POSSIBLE RESULTANT POLITICAL OVERTONE. CONTINUED SUPPORT OF GOM TRAINING NEEDS VIA IMETP IS A RELATIVELY INEXPENSIVE DEMONSTRATION OF CONTINUED US SUPPORT FOR MOROCCO.

(2) MINIMUM LEVEL - DOLS 1,000,000:

(A) DESCRIPTION: FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD ALLOW A MODEST PROGRAM OF REPLACEMENT TRAINING FOR SPECIALISTS ON US ORIGIN EQUIPMENT. HOWEVER, IT WOULD NOT REPLACE NORMAL ATTRITION NOR KEEP PACE WITH PLANNED FORCE EXPANSION IN ALL SERVICES. IT PROVIDES A MODEST PROGRAM OF PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND ENGLISH LANGUAGE INSTRUCTORS.

(B) RISK ASSESSEMENT: FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD MOST LIKELY RESULT IN GOM CHANNELING THE ENTIRE PROGRAM INTO TECHNICAL SKILLS BY-PASSING NEEDED LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT COURSES. BELOW THIS LEVEL SERIOUS GAPS IN MAINTENANCE SKILLS WOULD LIKELY OCCUR WITHOUT FMS PURCHASED TRAINING TO FILL THE GAP. GOM HAS PURCHASED SOME INITIAL TRAINING, AND MTT'S WITH RECENT EQUIPMENT ACQUISITIONS. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE AUSTERE FINANCIAL OUTLOOK IN MOROCCO, AND SEPARATE BUDGET PROCEDURES FOR TRAINING, THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO SEEK REPLACEMENT TRAINING THRU

FMS. THIS COULD RESULT IN A GRADUAL DETERIORATION OF CAPABILITY OR PREMATURE ATTRITION OF US EQUIPMENT DUE TO LACK OF MAINTENANCE OR OPERATOR SKILLS.

(3) INTERMEDIATE LEVEL - DOLS 1,200,000:

(A) DESCRIPTION: FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD ALLOW MODEST INCREASES OVER THE MINIMUM LEVEL IN PME COURSES AND INCREASED MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY TRAINING.

(B) RISK ASSESSMENT: EXPANDED AVAILABILITY OF MAINTENANCE SLOTS AT THIS ELVEL WOULD LIKELY ASSURE THAT GOM WOULD USE AVAILABLE PME SPACES AND SUPPLY MANAGEMENT COURSES THAT
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ARE SORELY NEEDED. WHILE NOT FULLY COVERING EXPECTED PERSONNEL ATTRITION, THIS LEVEL ASSURES AT LEAST A MINIMUM OF FLOW OF SPECIALISTS IN THE PRINCIPAL TECHNICAL SKILL AREAS, AND WOULD PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SUPPLY MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL. WITH THE ARRIVAL OF MOST OF THE ROYAL MOROCCAN ARMY (RMA) MODERNIZATION PROGRAM EQUIPMENT, SUPPLY MANAGEMENT IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN A VITAL CONCERN. RECEIPT, STORAGE AND ISSUE OF EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN SEVERELY STRAINED IN THE RMA DUE TO THE LARGE VOLUME OF MATERIAL ARRIVING IN COUNTRY AND BECAUSE OF THE ANTIQUATED RMA SUPPLY SYSTEM. IMPROVEMENT AND MODERANIZATION IN THIS AREA ARE URGENTLY NEEDED.

(4) CURRENT LEVEL - DOLS 1,500,000:

(A) DESCRIPTION: FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD PROVIDE A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF PME COURSES, INCREASED SUPPLY MANAGEMENT TRAINING AND ADEQUATE TECHNICAL SKILLS TO COVER NORMAL ATTRITION AT CURRENT FORCE LEVELS.

(B) RISK ASSESSMENT: THIS LEVEL COULD ASSURE AN ACCEPTABLE OPERATIONAL LEVEL FROM THE STANDPOINT OF AVAILABLE TRAINED MANPOWER. WITH PROGRAMMED INSTRUCTOR TRAINING, GOM COULD BEGIN TO ESTABLISH AN INDIGENOUS TRAINING CAPABILITY FOR REPLACEMENT TRAINING ON POSSESSED EQUIPMENT. SIGNIFICANT FORCE EXPANSION WOULD REQUIRE ADDITIONAL SPACES FOR FMS FUNDED TRAINING.

(5) INCREMENTAL LEVEL - DOLS 1,750,000:

(A) DESCRIPTION: FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD PROVIDE SUFFICIENT TRAINING TO ALLOW FOR PLANNED FORCE EXPANSION OF MOROCCAN MILITARY.

(B) RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MOST SIGNIFICANT THREAT FACED BY MOROCCO IS A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE FORCE BUILDUP BY ALGERIA. AT THE SAME TIME, MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY IN SOUTHERN PROVINCES AND THE ESTERN SAHARA HAVE PLACED A HEAVY STRESS ON THE GOM IN TERMS OF MONEY AND MANPOWER. OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS THE MILITARY FORCES HAVE INCREASED IN SIZE ABOUT 25 PERCENT WITH FUTURE INCREASES PLANNED TO BALANCE THE ALGERIAN BUILDUP. CONTINUED SUPPORT VIA THE IMETP WOULD ASSIST THE GOM IN DEVELOPING THE POOL OF TRAINED MANPOWER ESSENTIAL TO THESE PLANNED EXPANSIONS. PROVISION OF THIS
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TRAINING PROGRAM WOULD BE A CONTINUING DEMONSTRATION OF US SUPPORT AND WOULD WORK TOWARD A MORE STABLE MILITARY POSITION IN NORTH AFRICA VIS-A-VIS MOROCCO AND ALGERIA.

E. FUDING LEVEL FOR FY 81/82 SHOULD REMAIN ESSENTIALLY AT THE FY 80 LEVELS DISCUSSED ABOVE. WHILE TOTAL STUDENTS TRAINED WOULD DECREASE DUE TO INCREASED TRAINING COSTS, GOM SHOULD BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO ESTABLISH AN IN-COUNTRY CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE REPLACEMENT SKILLS IN THE TECHNICAL AREAS. THE REMAINING PROGRAM SHOULD BE HEAVILY WEIGHTED TOWARD LEADERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND OTHER PROFESSIONAL COURSES DESIGNED TO IMPROVE GOM ABILITY TO MANAGE RESOURCES.

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USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4-7//

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F. MANNING LEVEL - FY 80:

(QL MINIMUM LEVEL:

(A) DESCRIPTION:

US MILITARY 6

US CIVILIAN 5

LOCAL EMPLOYEES 1

TOTAL: 12

(B) RISK ANALYSIS: BECAUSE OF THE ANTICIPATED

LEVEL OF DELIVERIES FROM THE PIPELINE ON EXISTING CONTRACTS AND NEW PROGRAMS EXPECTED, PLUS THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT TO NEGOTIATE AND IMPLEMENT A SUPPLY SUPPORT ARRANGEMENT, MUSLO MUST BE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING LOGISTICS AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT

NOT SIGNIFICANTLY BELOW CURRENT LEVELS. THIS WOULD BE FEASIBLE AT THE LEVEL OF SIX MILITARY MEMBERS IF THE OFFICE WERE AUGMENTED BY THREE CIVILIAN SPECIALISTS. IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE AREA, ADDITIONAL REDUCTION IN FSL EMPLOYEES WOULD REQUIRE THE EMBASSY TO ASSUME TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT OF MUSLO, ALTHOUGH IT IS ALREADY OVERTAXED IN THIS AREA.

(2) INTERMEDIATE LEVEL:

(A) DESCRIPTION:

US MILITARY 9

US CIVILIANS 3

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LOCAL EMPLOYEES 2

TOTAL: 14

(B) RISK ASSESSMENT: REDUCTION OF MUSLO TO THIS LEVEL WILL RESULT IN A LESSENERED ABILITY TO PERFORM FIELD LIAISON WITH MILITARY UNITS WHICH WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT REPOSIVENESS TO EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS. THE LOSS OF A TRAINING SPECIALIST WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE IMETP. WORK ON THE SUPPLY SUPPORT ARRANGEMENT WOULD NECESSARILY CONTINUE, BUT WITH REDUCED EFFECTIVENESS. DEGRADTION IN THE LIAISON BETWEEN MUSLO AND THE EUCOM SERVICES BRANCES (ARMY, AIR FORCE AND NAVY) AND CPO PERTAINING TO PERSONNEL REQUISITIONS, MANPOWER MANAGEMENT, AND T2A BUDGET MANAGEMENT WOULD RESULT.

(3) CURRENT LEVEL (AS PROGRAMMED FROM CPD, FY 79):

(A) DESCRIPTION:

US MILITARY 13

US CIVILIANS 2

LOCAL EMPLOYEES 2

TOTAL: 17

(B) RISK ASSESSMENT: MAINTAINING CURRENT MANNING LEVELS WOULD ALLOW MUSLO TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF ANTI-CIPATED DELIVERIES AND PROJECTED SALES. THIS WOULD INCLUDE FREQUENT LIAISON TRIPS TO ARMY UNITS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE CUSTOMER SERVICE FOR NEW EQUIPMENT IN THE AREA OF LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT. THIS LEVEL ALSO PROVIDES ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLO AS WELL AS TRANSLATOR, INTERPRETER AND SECRETARIAL SERVICES. THE LEVEL OF TWO LOCAL EMPLOYEES IS INADEQUATE TO PROVIDE GENERAL SERVICES SUPPORT AND TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT WHICH INCLUDES TRANSPORT OF PERSONNEL TO THE MOROCCAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, UNITS, AND DEPOTS IN ORDER TO EFFECT LOGISTICAL AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF CURRENT PROGRAMS. NOTE: A REQUEST TO KEEP 4 LOCAL IN FY 79, DOWN FROM 6 IN FY 78, HAS BEEN MADE TO USCINCEUR. A LEVEL OF 2 LOCALS WOULD RESULT IN ASSUMPTION OF MOST DRIVING REQUIREMENTS BY MUSLO PERSONNEL AND ELIMINATION OF THREE ADMINISTRATIONAL SERVICES.

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TIVE USE VEHICLES, WHICH WERE DRIVEN AND SERVICED BY DRIVERS.
CONSIDERING THE REQUIRMENTS OF FREQUENT ONE-DAY, ROUND TRIPS
OF UP TO 120 MILES DISTANCES, ELIMINATION OF THESE POSITIONS
WOULD HAVE SERIOUS IMPACT.

G. MANNING LEVELS - FY 81/82

(1) MINIMUM LEVEL:

(A) DESCRIPTION	FY 81	FY 82
US MILITARY	6	6
US CIVILIANS	4	3
LOCAL EMPLOYEES	1	1
TOTAL:	11	10

(2) INTERMEDIATE LEVEL:

(A) DESCRIPTION:

US MILITARY	6	6
US CIVILIANS	5	4
LOCAL EMPLOYEES	1	1
TOTAL:	12	11

(3) CURRENT LEVEL:

(A) DESCRIPTION:

US MILITARY	9	6
US CIVILIANS	3	5
LOCAL EMPLOYEES	2	1
TOTAL:	14	12

(4) INCREMENTAL:

(A) DESCRIPTION:

US MILITARY	9
US CIVILIANS	2
LOCAL EMPLOYEES	2
TOTAL:	13

(B) RISK ASSESSMENT: AS THE LEVEL OF CONTRACT

DELIVERIES DROPS SUBSEQUENT TO FY 80, MUSLO REQUIRMENT FOR
INTENSIVE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AND FIELD VISITS WILL DECLINE.
HOWEVER, CONTINUED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE LARGE AMOUNT OF
EQUIPMENT RECEIVED AND MANAGEMENT OF THE TRAINING PROGRAMS WILL
REQUIRE CONTINUED EFFORTS ALONG WITH ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT
OF MUSLO FUNCTIONS. FUTURE PROGRAMS WILL ALSO ADD NEW
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PROBLEMS IN THE AREAS OF CONTRACT AND LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT,
WHICH MAY INCREASE THE REQUIRED MANAGEMENT TEAM.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SECURITY, MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 27 jul 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978RABAT04534
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780308-0561
Format: TEL
From: RABAT
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780714/aaaaaljg.tel
Line Count: 1026
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: e830d76b-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION PM
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 19
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 STATE 167901, 78 STATE 168320
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 02 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1867379
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: FIRST ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE
TAGS: MASS, MO
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/e830d76b-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014